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Why We Need an Industrial Strategy
for the United States Economy
Robert Cohen, Ph.D.*
I would like to respond to the question of whether we should have an
industrial policy in a strongly affirmative way. It is necessary for us
to have a more focused industrial policy, which I would redefine as a
focused economic strategy. I would like to also respond to the points
that were raised in the Conference materials about questions concern-
ing industrial policy. We are not holding our own in many of the tech-
nology industries that are going to be crucial to the growth of the
United States' economy in the future. In fact, we may have already lost
the battle. Unless we make decisive efforts, there will be entire areas of
future technology competence in which the United States will be lack-
ing. If this happens, our economy will suffer by having slower produc-
tivity and employment growth.
I think that an industrial policy can certainly be consumer
friendly. There is no need for decisions to be made that would inadver-
tently, or in an unfriendly way, affect consumers. In fact, the argument
here in terms of consumer preferences should not be over how many
choices are available to consumers via free trade. It should consider
what kind of economic base we have for the future if we lose some of
these core competences in our industrial economy. I compare these to
the analysis that has been done over the last few years of the core com-
petence of the corporation and transfer this concept over to the core
competence of the economy. We are failing to provide the ultimate con-
sumers in the economy with adequate new jobs, with new technologies
that provide the kind of growth in productivity and growth in real
wealth in the economy that has been our experience in the past. This
failure has become evident during the last fifteen or twenty years.
We also have to talk directly about the concern that is often raised
about picking winners or losers. There is a very poorly recognized but
well documented history in the United States of industrial policy.
When we did this at our best, we followed a kind of agricultural paral-
lel. In other words, government set the environment, provided the nutri-
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ents, assured that the rules of the game were even, and then got out of
the way. In some cases, this involved a very short-term presence. But in
terms of nascent industries, a few instances where we did the best in-
volved a long-term vision and a long-term commitment to insuring that
we had a global presence in those industries.
I would like to recount some of our own experiences and our own
successes, which I think are very poorly recognized in the whole story
of industrial policy. In fact, in examining them closer, I feel that the
Japanese, who have been cited as some of the most successful users of
industrial policy or economic strategy, are the copycats and we were
the originators.
Why should we have a more focused industrial policy? Other na-
tions, particularly Japan, have undercut our strategic industries of the
future. Key technology industries such as robotics, machine tools, and
semiconductors have been affected over the last decade or two. Our loss
of these industries will dramatically impact the development of a range
of new technology industries in the next several decades. This will oc-
cur not only in relation to Japan but through efforts to promote na-
tional infrastructure of the future in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Sin-
gapore and the European Community. I am not singling out Japan as
the only nation likely to be effective and the only opponent in terms of
how we respond to new types of competition. What has characterized
this approach by our rivals is trying to figure out how to shape the
environment, how to influence outcomes, and how to create another
new dimension. Many of these countries think in supersectoral ways.
They are no longer thinking of this industry versus that industry, but
trying to look at areas where a confluence of technologies becomes cru-
cial for growth.
When Singapore sets an industrial policy for the information sec-
tor it is not just talking about computers, it is investing in communica-
tions, computer skills, software development and a whole range of re-
lated things. The efficiency of individual corporate decision making has
changed. A software firm's decision may be good for itself, but put in
the context of this informations complex, that decision may be detri-
mental to the national interest. That is what a number of the more
successful countries have begun to do. They look at these future oppor-
tunities and future growth prospects in terms of a complex of indus-
tries. The fact that these complex decisions are not handled well by
decision making at the micro-level is another reason for having a fo-
cused industrial policy.
This loss of technology leadership in some of the critical sectors
that we have experienced over the last decade or two provides addi-
tional reasons why there ought to be a focused industrial policy. What
has this loss done to the U.S. economy? For one, it has reduced our
future innovation because the few firms that are left in an industry
[Vol. 19:11 1993
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such as robotics are hampered by a lack of economies of scale needed
for the investment to develop the future technologies, new equipment,
R&D, and new manufacturing experimentation to move on to the next
stages of innovation. In addition, the small number of companies that
are left reduces the overall profitability and the individual profitability
of the companies that remain. This has a dramatic impact on the
amount of Research & Development ("R&D") spending that they can
do. Certainly in the robotics sector that R&D spending has been di-
minished considerably.
Secondly, I think that the impacts of foreign industrial policy have
limited U.S. productivity gains since the U.S. companies that are using
technology get delayed deliveries of critical equipment. For example, in
the machine tool industry, Mercedes and Toyota will get innovative
machine tools before Ford, GM and Chrysler. Nobody has done a
quantitative analysis of what this means, but certainly the year and a
half, two, or two and a half year delay means a lot to the competitive-
ness of our auto industry. So, our loss of competence in certain technol-
ogy industries spills over and has a dramatic effect on the competitive-
ness of other sectors.
The third point is that the loss of the key technology industries
erodes the chain of their supplier companies. These firms begin to falter
and often go out of business. In the semiconductor industry, one of the
things that was noted as soon as the Japanese share of the global mar-
ket and the U.S. market accelerated was a real erosion of many of the
"food chain" industries that provided intermediate goods for making
semiconductors. Semiconductor equipment manufacturing companies
and packaging companies almost disappeared or were bought out by
the Japanese.
Fourthly, the ability of U.S. companies to shift into new critical
areas where competences need to be created gets eroded by the political
turf fighting and disagreements that can affect certain sectors in the
United States. Right now we are facing this kind of issue in the tele-
communications industry where we have cable companies versus tele-
phone and computer companies who want to see the communications
infrastructure become far more friendly to the use of digital technol-
ogy. Yet the phone companies are saying, we want to do it the way we
always have since this is the way we invented it in the United States. I
was very struck by an announcement in the press from Japan concern-
ing NTT, the National Telephone Company for Japan, which has been
a pioneer in moving into advanced technologies. It decided to take one
route, which was to go with Integrated Services Digital Network
("ISDN") technology, a technology which has been introduced in Eu-
rope but has not had much success in the United States.
Last year, because there were not many applications available,
NTT lost a half billion dollars and invested about $450 billion. They
3
Cohen: Why We Need an Industrial Strategy for the United States Economy
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1993
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
have now decided that, instead of doing this two-step ISDN route to
move to new technology areas, they are going to adopt the technology
of packet switching which the computer companies in the United
States, and many of the other very well informed people, believe is the
one-step way to go towards the future and to do it less expensively.
They expect to cut their investment costs in half so that next year they
will only need $200 billion of new investment. But I think, more impor-
tantly, it is a way of moving ahead that involves a consensus in Japan.
When NTT decides to do something, it is not some intelligent executive
at the top, but rather it is a series of discussions between the Japanese
electronics industry and the Japanese Government.
This same kind of cross-fertilization and "cross-thinking" has oc-
curred successfully in the telecommunications industry in both France
and Germany, where there has been a recognition that certain key ap-
plications have to be seeded. The German Government has decided,
along with the major electronics companies, to set up an experiment in
Berlin where all types of advanced applications are being funded, ex-
amined and developed with the private sector. There is a sort of public/
private collaboration in figuring out how to move ahead.
This ability to set an environment will enable these countries to
move ahead in telecommunications. The question is whether the US,
facing various kinds of old-fashioned frameworks, will be able to as-
semble the kind of collaboration needed to overcome the barriers to
progress.
What does the competition do that we do not do? Here I am try-
ing to set forth some lessons that we ought to pick up and apply to our
own thinking for the future. One thing that is clear is that the competi-
tion tries to be intelligent about economic development. They try to
bring together the best minds that they have, the best knowledge that
they can put together, to shape the direction of their economy. We
spend much less time doing that.
I spoke recently with Professor Wassily Leontief, the Nobel Prize
Winner from New York University for input/output studies. Most of
his time today is spent thinking about helping Japan. Most of his stu-
dents, who are thinking about the future, are in Tokyo working for
Japanese ministries. A series of Japanese ministries employ something
like 200 economists working on input/output analyses. In the United
States, the Commerce Department has probably a dozen, at most two
dozen, people focusing on this. We give it very little importance in eval-
uating what our policies should be.
In Japan, when I have looked at the computer industry or the
semiconductor industry, there are input/output tables that I can refer
to which show me exactly how much the Japanese believe the electron-
ics and information sectors will contribute to their economy in the year
2000 or the year 2010. I have heard they have taken their estimates
[Vol. 19:11 1993
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another ten or fifteen years down the road.
It is this ability to evaluate the long-term evolution of both the
global and the national economy that some of our competitors possess
that we do not. Some other examples will illustrate this point.
In France, when there was concern where the electronics industry
was going, the President established a formal committee to evaluate
digital communications and the computer industry. This committee
evaluated what kind of approach should be taken. It involved both pub-
lic and private sector people and some of the leading thinkers in
France.
In Germdny, there is an ongoing circle that centers around some
people in Munich that informally collaborates with people in the gov-
ernment. This group includes people in industry that think about what
kind of public policy changes are needed and what kinds of initiatives
are required to assure German competence in advanced
communications.
In Japan, future technology groups meet and report in a formal
way to the Agency for Science and Technology about what new tech-
nologies are emerging. What is interesting about these groups is that
they try to isolate the critical barriers in developing new technologies.
In other words, we have had an approach over the past that what is
good is to promote pre-competitive technology, but this group identifies
specific barriers to commercial success to be addressed by both indus-
try and government.
In Japan, what these future technology assessments do is identify
what new technology industries are emerging. This gets down to very,
very specific things. One of the more fascinating things that these as-
sessments did in the last three or four years was to look at the connec-
tion between different technology fields. In other words, how could you
use biotechnology and electronics to come up with new products or new
industries. One example was how to create products such as something
to open your office, car or house doors by putting your fingers into a
slot and having the electronics read your fingerprint, or body heat, or
both, and then open the door, thereby doing away with keys. It is this
connection between different, usually unrelated, technology industries
that they were trying to explore. They point out not only what technol-
ogies are emerging but they also try to identify where private industry
is likely to support the funding for those emerging technologies and
where it is unlikely to support the funding for those emerging technolo-
gies. These groups then recommend that the government step in where
there is an enormous opportunity, which may be missed because the
private sector may feel that there is too much risk to put its own funds
in place. So, the government acts as a facilitator. The government's
effort is matched with these abilities to identify the roadblocks in com-
mercializing new technologies.
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Overall, the aim of these exercises is to identify where the future
value in the economy is going to come from and where the biggest
gains in marginal productivity will be. In other words, where are these
economies likely to gain the most in global competition and in the gen-
eration of jobs? These two questions are critical for the United States.
The whole question of developing chains of inter-related industries that
are totally or very largely interdependent upon each other, whether it is
groups of suppliers and final users, or industries where technology de-
velopments in one sector are very significant in the success of another
sector, are very critical and well recognized by other countries and not
as w ell recognized by our own policies.
The other thing that our rivals do that is significant is to set forth
some vision of where they would like to see their economy move in the
future.' This could be called a road map, but in many cases it sets a
strategy that identifies some direction for overall policy. Certainly the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI") is best recog-
nized for doing this. From time to time, MITI publishes a series of
visions, in some cases for computer industry or semiconductor industry,
in other cases taking a much broader vision of where the entire Japa-
nese economy is going. They are not the only ones who have done this.
Certainly, the European Community has set out a series of technology
plans, usually for a five-year period. The Europeans focus on specific
sectors and have plans for specific industries that have been assembled
as a result of consultations between industry and policy makers. They
have now moved much closer to the marketplace in terms of their ori-
entation for their programs and they have put a much larger emphasis
on software and on knowledge-intensive applications.
We are also seeing these visions or road maps developed by newly-
industrializing countries. What is fascinating is to see Singapore, Hong
Kong, Korea and Taiwan developing information technology plans.
They are identifying the kinds of skills and important sectors that they
feel they have to develop, providing incentives for private firms to come
in to assure that some of these skills are available in the economy, and
almost becoming technology "way-stations" by having fiber-optic links
from one place to another to assure that they have the best
communications.
A friend was startled recently when I said that the new fiber-optic
link that is being developed by a number of phone companies to Asia
runs directly from Marseille in France to Singapore in Asia without
stopping. He was amazed that it did not go through India or the Mid-
dle East. It goes directly from Europe to Singapore and the time for
transmitting a message over that length will be less than one second.
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So, the distance between the global community becomes almost as
though Asia is next door to Europe. These capabilities will include not
just voice communications but also video and data and a myriad of
other abilities.
In addition to these visions, the other thing that our competitors do
is figure out how to cope with the failures of industrial policy. The best
example of this was in Japan where a series of initiatives in the 1950s
and 1960s to raise their semiconductor industry to the level of the in-
dustry in the United States failed. Japan went through a series of four
programs with the first three resulting in complete failure, largely due
to Japan's inability to create the kind of semiconductors needed for
computers. But in the fourth program, Japan's government and indus-
try put together what was a "Japanese Manhattan Project" and
reached a level of equivalency with American semiconductor technol-
ogy. The ability to do this and figure out how to cope with failure is
also very key to moving ahead.
How should the U.S. respond to these challenges? What we need
to do is re-establish the kind of structure that has been used by our
competitors overseas. We need an economic strategy. We need a vision
of where the economy is going and what problems need to be ad-
dressed. We have to establish complimentary policies to this vision and
to collaborate with industry. We need to set out ideas for key and
emerging technologies and make sense of what is often a complex sys-
tem. We need to move beyond traditional American support for R&D
that has characterized our policies since the late 1940s and consider
how to commercialize new technologies more successfully.
I want to provide a couple of examples of how the U.S. govern-,
ment was an initiator and succeeded in using industrial policy. At the
end of the first World War, the United States faced a situation where
much of the emerging communications technology was in foreign
hands. When President Wilson went to the Versailles Treaty negotia-
tions, he was shocked that the U.S. might not have the capability to
contact its own fleet or its own merchant marine with wireless commu-
nications. Marconi, Siemens and other companies in Europe dominated
this technology and owned most of the patents. Franklin Roosevelt,
who was the Assistant Navy Secretary, was also involved in these deci-
sions. When the US delegation returned, officials organized a series of
meetings to discuss with General Electric and a number of other com-
panies what might be done to reverse the situation where the United
States would end up being a technology purchaser rather than a tech-
nology innovator. The officials and industrialists recognized that the fu-
ture might see the development of wireless communications and other
technological possibilities that would grow out of this new technology.
What did the United States do? Under President Wilson, it estab-
lished the Radio Corporation of America, RCA. The stock owners in
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RCA included some of the key technology companies of that era: Gen-
eral Electric, Westinghouse, and AT&T. It also included United Fruit,
one of the major users of wireless communications for its fruits shipped
from Latin America. Another shareholder was the United States Navy
which owned twenty percent of the stock. Government contracts per-
mitted RCA, in its infancy, to purchase the kind of equipment it re-
quired and to pool patents. A change in the antitrust laws, which other
consortia could not do, gave RCA the boost it needed. This was one of
the most successful consortia ever created, because in the early 1920s,
RCA began to develop radio technology, which achieved a huge com-
mercial success.
What RCA demonstrates (and it is not a well known story) is the
ability of the United States to focus on an area where we are behind, to
create the kind of symbiotic relationship between government and in-
dustry to get us active in a technology, and to set up the kind of vision
that can lead us into the future.
I think there are other cases where we have been successful and
not successful. In my view, the successes outweigh the failures. We set
the context and probably taught other countries how to play this game.
Currently, we are losing and we need to do something dramatically
different from our approach in the past. We need to implement an eco-
nomic strategy for our country that will move us ahead.
[Vol. 19:11 1993
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